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ABSTRACT
Recently, many deep neural network (DNN) based modulation clas-
sification schemes have been proposed in the literature. We have
evaluated the robustness of two famous such modulation classifiers
(based on the techniques of convolutional neural networks and long
short term memory) against adversarial machine learning attacks
in black-box settings. We have used Carlini & Wagner (C-W) attack
for performing the adversarial attack. To the best of our knowledge,
the robustness of these modulation classifiers have not been evalu-
ated through C-W attack before. Our results clearly indicate that
state-of-art deep machine learning based modulation classifiers are
not robust against adversarial attacks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning (ML) especially deep ML schemes have beaten
human-level performance in many computer vision, language, and
speech processing tasks which were considered impossible a decade
ago. This success of ML schemes has inspired the ideas of self-
driving networks [2] and knowledge defined networking [5] where
ML schemes are profoundly utilized to ensure automation and
control of networking tasks such as dynamic resource allocation,
modulation classification, network traffic classification, etc.
Despite the success of ML in different modern communication
and data networking applications, there are some pitfalls in the
fundamental assumptions of ML schemes which can be exploited
by the adversaries to craft adversarial examples in order to com-
promise the ML-based system. An adversarial example is defined
as an input to the ML model specially crafted by an adversary by
adding a small imperceptible perturbation to the input sample to
compromise the performance of the ML model. Mathematically,
an adversarial example x∗ can be formed by adding a typically-
imperceptible perturbation δ to the legitimate test example x of
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the deployed trained classifier f (.). The perturbation δ is computed
by approximating the following nonlinear optimization problem
provided in equation 1 where t is the targeted class in case of a
targeted attack or any other wrong class is the case of untargeted
attack.
x∗ = x + argmin
ηx
{∥η∥ : f (x + η) = t} (1)
Adversarial examples are possible because of two major faulty
assumptions in ML schemes. Firstly, the underlying data distribu-
tion experienced during the training phase of the ML model will
also be encountered in the testing phase. This data stationarity is
not valid for most of the real world cases and the void created by
following this assumption is exploited by the adversary for craft-
ing the adversarial examples. Secondly, most of the ML schemes
are based on the empirical risk minimization (ERM), which is an
approximation of the actual unknown probability distribution. The
ERM has an associated error with it which can be exploited by the
adversary to make an adversarial example.
Adversarial attacks can be classified broadly into white-box and
black-box attacks based on the knowledge of the adversary about
the deployed ML model. In a white-box attack, it is assumed that
adversary has complete knowledge (hyperparameters, test data,
etc.) of the deployed model whereas in a black-box attack no such
knowledge is assumed and it is assumed that the adversary can
only act as a standard user and query the system for a response.
In this paper, we have taken modulation classification (which
is an important component of modern communication and data
networks) as a proxy of functional areas of cognitive self-driving
networks. We have performed a black-box adversarial attack on
DNN-based modulation classification to highlight the brittleness of
ML schemes utilized in cognitive self-driving networks.
2 RELATEDWORK
There does not exist much literature on adversarial attacks on
modulation classification. Recently, Sadeghi et al. [7] used a variant
of fast gradient sign method (FGSM) attack [3] on modulation
classification on CNN-based modulation classification to highlight
the threat of the adversarial examples. FGSM is an adversarial
sample crafting algorithm where the adversarial perturbation is
calculated by taking a gradient step in the direction of the sign
of the gradient of test example. Kokalj et al. [4] also crafted the
adversarial examples for modulation classification by using the
FGSM perturbation generation algorithm. Most of the available
results on the application of the adversarial attacks are reported by
using the FGSM attack.
A shortcoming with the FGSM attack is its lack of optimality
in adversarial perturbation generation as FGSM was designed to
quickly craft adversarial examples irrespective of the optimality
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and the size of the perturbation in the test example. To overcome
the lack of optimality and to highlight that optimal adversarial
example for modulation classification can be crafted we have used
Carlini & Wagner (C-W) attack [1] where the adversarial examples
are crafted using the following optimization process provided in
equation 2.
minimize
η
∥η∥P + c .д(x∗)
such that x∗ ∈ [0, 1]n
(2)
Figure 1: The step by step procedure followed for crafting
black-box adversarial attack against DL-based modulation
classification is depicted in the figure.
3 BLACK-BOX ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
PROCEDURE
In this section, we will provide our black-box adversarial attack
procedure (illustrated in Figure 1). The steps followed are: 1) the
adversary queries the deployed modulation classifier with test ex-
amples; 2) the deployed modulation classifier provides a labeled
response to the adversary considering the adversary as a normal
user; 3) the adversary stores the query-response pair in a database
(which is later used as a substitute dataset for training a surrogate
DNN); 4) once sufficient data is collected in the adversarial database,
the adversary constructs a fully connected DNN model and trains it
for suitable classification performance; 5) once the surrogate DNN
is trained, the adversary launches a C-W attack on the surrogate
DNN for crafting adversarial examples that compromises the per-
formance of the surrogate DNNmodel; 6) adversarial examples that
compromises the performance of surrogate DNN-model are then
transferred to black-box DL-based modulation classifier which ac-
cording to the transferability property of adversarial examples will
compromise the performance of DL-based modulation classifier.
Since we are performing this experiment in lab settings, we have
opted for training two modulation classifiers based on CNN and
LSTM and then considered them as black-box models. We have
used highly-cited GNU radio ML RML2016.10a dataset [6] which
provides 11 digital and analog modulation schemes on the SNR
ranging from -20 dB to 18dB. We have used only 10% of the test
examples to construct the surrogate classifier and then performed
C-W attack the performance of the surrogate DNN model before
and after the attack is provided in Figure 1. Once the adversarial
attack on surrogate DNN is completed, we have transferred the
adversarial examples that evaded the surrogate DNN to black-box
modulation classifier by leveraging the transferability property of
adversarial ML. The performance impact of the adversarial attack
is provided in Figures 1 and 2. A clear drop in the accuracy of the
modulation classifier after the adversarial attack highlights that our
method of performing black-box adversarial attack has successfully
compromised the performance crafted adversarial examples.
Figure 2: Performance of black-box adversarial attack on
CNN-based modulation classification.
Figure 3: Performance of black-box adversarial attack on
LSTM-based modulation classification.
4 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have highlighted the lack of robustness in deep
learning based modulation classification by performing a black-box
adversarial attack on CNN and LSTM based modulation classifiers.
We have used a surrogate deep neural network for crafting adver-
sarial examples and then showed that adversarial examples crafted
for modulation classification are transferable to other deep learning
based models. We have achieved a 60% performance drop in both
CNN and LSTM based modulation classification.
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